Paul Bryan v. Children and Youth Ser of Erie by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-20-2014 
Paul Bryan v. Children and Youth Ser of Erie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Paul Bryan v. Children and Youth Ser of Erie" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 508. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/508 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 12-4623 
PAUL BRYAN; BONNIE BRYAN, Husband and Wife, 
individually and as Parents and Natural Guardians on behalf 
of their minor child, KB, and KB, KENNETH BRYAN 
v. 
ERIE COUNTY OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH; 
PAUL CANCILLA, individually and as an employee of Erie 
County Office of Children and Youth; CARMEN E. 
MERRITT, individually and as an employee of Erie County 
Office of Children and Youth; RENIE SKALKO, 
individually and as an employee of Erie County Office of 
Children and Youth; CINDY BAXTER, individually and as 
an employee of Erie County Office of Children and Youth; 
CINDY LEWIS, individually and as an employee of Erie 
County Office of Children and Youth; BRIGETTE 
SULLIVAN, individually and as an employee of Erie County 
Office of Children and Youth; JOHN PETULLA, 
individually and as an employee of Erie County Office of 
Children and Youth DPW Bureau of County Children and 
Youth Programs  
Cindy Baxter and Renie Skalko, 
Appellants. 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
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District Judge: Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
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OPINION  
FUENTES, Circuit Judge  
In the midst of trial in the District Court, the parties 
agreed to a high-low settlement. Regardless of the verdict, the 
Bryan family was to receive at least $900,000. And regardless 
of the verdict, defendants Cindy Baxter and Renie Skalko 
were to pay no more than $2.7 million. So when the jury 
returned an $8.6 million verdict for the Bryans, Baxter and 
Skalko tendered $2.7 million and asked the Bryans to end the 
action. The Bryans refused. They asserted that Baxter and 
Skalko had breached the settlement agreement’s 
confidentiality clause and thereby rendered the deal 
unenforceable. The parties brought their dispute to the 
District Court. But the District Court refused to resolve it, 
reasoning that the Court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction 
to decide whether to enforce the parties’ terms or the jury’s 
verdict.  
The District Court erred. The parties presented their 
dispute to the District Court in order to bring the action to a 
close. The case had not been dismissed, nor had the jury’s 
verdict been marked satisfied. Indeed, the action remained 
active and ongoing: the parties continued to litigate the effect 
of the jury’s verdict up to and after taking this appeal. The 
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case should have remained with the District Court. Ancillary 
jurisdiction exists, for example, for post-judgment 
proceedings related to the enforcement of the judgment. 
Similarly, the District Court had jurisdiction to decide 
whether or not to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. A 
district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at the moment 
the jury’s deliberations do. 
The parties raise two other matters that we do not decide: 
(1) the merits of the Bryan family’s allegation that Baxter and 
Skalko breached the settlement agreement and (2) Baxter and 
Skalko’s argument that the District Court ought to have 
granted summary judgment in their favor. The District Court 
has not had an opportunity to consider the first issue and 
Baxter and Skalko have not addressed the second issue in 
light of the trial record. Accordingly, we remand for further 
proceedings before the District Court.  
I. Background of the Case 
A. After the Bryans adopted J.O., he assaulted one of 
their children. 
During the summer of 2001, violence seized the Bryan 
family household. Their adopted son, J.O., repeatedly raped 
and molested his younger foster brother, K.B., in the room the 
boys shared together. After suffering through weeks of abuse, 
K.B. eventually told his parents, Paul and Bonnie Bryan. The 
Bryans then contacted the Erie County Office of Children and 
Youth (“ECOCY”)—the agency that facilitated J.O.’s 
adoption—and had J.O. removed from their home. 
The Bryans blamed ECOCY for K.B.’s ordeal. Among 
others employed at ECOCY, the Bryans focused on Renie 
Skalko and Cindy Baxter. Skalko served as one of J.O.’s 
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caseworkers. Baxter helped coordinate the Supportive Host 
Program, which aimed to transition institutionalized children, 
such as J.O., into foster homes. Through that program, Skalko 
and Baxter introduced J.O. to the Bryans and, eventually, 
helped facilitate the adoption. According to the Bryans, 
however, ECOCY and its employees concealed J.O.’s history 
during this process. ECOCY staff had reports of J.O.’s history 
of violent behavior and sexual misconduct, but did not 
disclose them to the Bryans. 
B. Proceedings in the District Court 
The Bryans sued ECOCY and seven of its employees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of their 
Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. 
After an appeal to this Court for permission to amend the 
complaint, see Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children & Youth 
Servs., 293 F. App’x 143 (3d Cir. 2008), the case proceeded 
on a state-created danger theory. That theory of liability 
permits a plaintiff to recover from state actors when “the 
state’s own actions create the very danger that causes the 
plaintiff’s injury.” See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 167 
(3d Cir. 2013). The Bryans alleged that ECOCY employees 
had placed KB into harm’s way. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
many defendants. But the Court did not grant summary 
judgment for Baxter and Skalko on the merits of the Bryans’ 
state-created danger claim or on Baxter and Skalko’s 
qualified immunity defense. The Court identified contested 
questions of fact that deserved the jury’s attention. In 
particular, the Court described the conflicting evidence about 
how much of J.O.’s history Skalko and Baxter knew, how 
much they told the Bryans, and whether, in light of that 
6 
 
knowledge, it was prudent to place J.O. into a foster home at 
all. (App’x 39-54, 69.) 
C. During trial, the parties agreed to a high-low 
settlement. 
The parties tried their case to a jury. During the trial, the 
parties reached a “Stipulated to High/Low Agreement.” This 
agreement constrained the parties’ financial risks by 
stipulating a recovery range between the low of $900,000 and 
the high of $2.7 million. If the jury returned a verdict of 
$900,000 or less, the Bryans would receive $900,000. If the 
jury returned a verdict of $2.7 million or more, Skalko and 
Baxter would pay $2.7 million. If the jury returned a verdict 
between the high and the low, the parties had to accept that 
result. The agreement contemplated that payment would 
terminate the action: “Upon payment of any of the 
aforementioned amount by the Defendants, the verdict is 
deemed satisfied and any and all of Plaintiffs [sic] claims 
which are the subject of this lawsuit are dismissed forever and 
any and all appellate rights are hereby waived by all the 
Plaintiffs; and defendants.” (App’x 188.) 
In addition to the high-low terms, the agreement also 
contained confidentiality provisions. Paragraph 11 required 
the Bryans to “limit their public comments about ECOCY and 
the individual ECOCY Defendants” and to “say that the 
ECOCY and Defendants did the right thing by [the Bryans’ 
son] and the parties are satisfied with the outcome.” (App’x 
188.) Paragraph 15 forbade the agreement from being 
disclosed to the jury. Paragraph 16 stipulated that “[t]his 
Agreement shall be CONFIDENTIAL subject to the duties, if 
any, of the ECOCY and/or its employees under the 
Pennsylvania Right to Know Act.” (App’x 189.) And 
Paragraph 18 required the parties to “put [the] Agreement on 
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the record with the court to memorialize the same following 
entry of the verdict or court order disposing of the case.” 
(App’x 189.)  
The jury returned a verdict of $8,654,769 in favor of the 
Bryan family. After the jury announced its verdict, the Court 
and the parties conferenced about what to do next. Skalko and 
Baxter stated their intention “to make an oral motion to mold 
the verdict consistent with our agreement to $2.7 million.” 
(App’x 742.) After discussing the matter, however, the 
parties’ attorneys and the Court agreed to enter a stipulation 
of dismissal instead: 
[ECOCY’s Attorney]: Why don’t 
we do this. We have an agreement 
for a high/low that we previously 
signed, we’re going to issue 
checks for $2.7 million to you. If 
you accept that, once we’ve 
issued the checks, we will file a 
stipulation of dismissal. 
[Bryans’ Attorney]: That’s fine. 
The Court: All right, we’re done.  
(App’x 743-44.) Shortly after the post-verdict conference, the 
District Court entered judgment in favor of the Bryans in the 
amount of $8,654,769.00.  
Defendants’ counsel then tendered $2.7 million to satisfy 
the agreement. The Bryans accepted the money “as only 
partial payment on the judgment.” (App’x 190.) In a letter to 
Skalko and Baxter, the Bryans questioned whether Baxter and 
Skalko had “violated the terms of the high/low agreement 
which would render the agreement void or voidable.” (App’x 
190.) In particular, the Bryans alleged that Skalko and Baxter, 
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or their agents, had disclosed the terms of the agreement to 
county councilmen.  
In response, Skalko and Baxter filed a “Motion to Satisfy 
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60” and a “Motion for Leave to File 
Rule 59 Motions Under Seal.” (Doc. Nos. 361-62.) The Court 
directed the parties to brief the settlement dispute, and it 
denied Baxter and Skalko’s motion to file the briefs under 
seal. The Court remarked: “I can’t imagine for the life of me 
why it’s appropriate to file anything under seal.” (App’x 750.) 
While briefing the Rule 60 motion, Skalko and Baxter also 
filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rule 
59(e), or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial Under Rule 
59(a)(1)(A).” (Doc. No. 363.) This motion identified 
numerous trial errors. It also purported to renew Skalko and 
Baxter’s argument that they were immune from liability.  
D. The District Court denied Skalko and Baxter’s 
motion to enforce the high-low agreement. 
The District Court denied Skalko and Baxter’s post-trial 
motions. The Court concluded that it lacked “jurisdiction to 
resolve the dispute relative to the enforceability of the 
agreement.” (App’x 7.) The District Court observed that the 
high-low agreement “was solely the product of counsels’ 
efforts with no involvement of the court,” that “[i]t was not 
made part of the record prior to the case being closed,” and 
that the Court “did not retain jurisdiction to resolve any 
dispute arising under it.” (App’x 12.) The District Court noted 
that it denied the motions “without prejudice to reassert them, 
as may be appropriate, after a ruling by the state court on the 
issues germane to the alleged breach of the Agreement.” 
(App’x 12.)  
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Skalko and Baxter filed a notice of appeal identifying two 
specific issues: the District Court’s decision regarding 
jurisdiction and its denial of summary judgment. They did not 
appeal from the judgment in favor of the Bryans, or brief the 
merits of their Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment or to 
receive a new trial.  
II. Jurisdiction 
Defendants Skalko and Baxter’s “Motion to Satisfy 
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 60” seeks relief on the grounds that the 
judgment has been “satisfied, released or discharged.” See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). The denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
may or may not constitute a final order. See Penn W. Assocs., 
Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2004). The one in 
this case does: The District Court’s decision, which followed 
the entry of judgment, ended the litigation on the merits. The 
District Court had nothing left to do but to execute the 
judgment it had entered on the record. See Catlin v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). We therefore take 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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III. Analysis 
A. The District Court’s jurisdiction over the high-low 
agreement
1
  
The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the 
Bryans’ lawsuit because it presented a federal question. See 
28 U.S.C. § 1331. The presence of a federal question confers 
jurisdiction to a district court for an entire “civil action.” Id. 
As part of its original jurisdiction over an action, a district 
court must consider the parties’ post-trial motions concerning 
the trial, the verdict, and the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 
54, 59, 62. A district court’s jurisdiction does not terminate at 
the moment the jury’s deliberations do.  
In certain circumstances, a federal court has jurisdiction to 
consider claims or to conduct proceedings beyond those 
raised by the original action itself. For example, when the 
parties present “other claims that are so related to claims in 
the action . . . that they form part of the same case or 
controversy,” a federal court may exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over them. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Additionally, when 
matters “incident to the disposition of the primary matter” 
arise before a court, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction 
permits district courts to decide them. United States v. 
Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 2001). Thus, the limits 
                                              
1
 This Court usually reviews denials of Rule 60 motions for 
abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 
F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). But we review de novo whether 
the District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. See 
Emerald Investors Trust v. Gaunt Parsippany Partners, 492 
F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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of a court’s original jurisdiction do not define the limits of the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. When a federal court has 
original jurisdiction over an entire action, it has limited 
authority to decide certain related claims or conduct 
incidental proceedings. See generally 13 Charles Alan Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3523 
(3d ed. 2013) (discussing supplemental, ancillary, and 
pendent jurisdiction, as well as their limits).  
A federal court has jurisdiction to decide a Rule 60(b)(5) 
motion made by a party to a pending action. A Rule 60 
motion does not “affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its 
operation,” see Rule 60(c)(2), so it does not form part of the 
original action. Indeed, Rule 60(b)(5) motions are used by a 
judgment-debtor to relieve itself of an already-final judgment 
that has been satisfied, released, or discharged. See, e.g., 
Sunderland v. City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089, 1090 (3d 
Cir. 1978); see also Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 995-96 
(9th Cir. 2007); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., Inc., 157 
F.3d 582, 584 (8th Cir. 1998). But that does not mean that a 
federal court lacks the jurisdiction to decide a Rule 60(b)(5) 
motion. To the contrary, a federal court may entertain 
garnishment, attachment, or other proceedings that “assist in 
the protection and enforcement of federal judgments.” 
Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996); see also Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 64, 69, 70 (providing various post-judgment 
enforcement and execution procedures). We conclude that the 
same ancillary jurisdiction that supports post-judgment 
enforcement proceedings supports proceedings to seek relief 
from the judgment. The jurisdiction to enforce a judgment 
necessarily includes the jurisdiction to declare the judgment 
satisfied. 
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Accordingly, when Skalko and Baxter moved pursuant to 
Rule 60(b) to relieve themselves from the judgment, the 
District Court had jurisdiction to decide the motion. The 
nature of the defendants’ argument did not counsel otherwise. 
To show why the Court should grant Rule 60(b) relief, Skalko 
and Baxter pointed to a high-low settlement agreement. And 
to show why the Court should deny Rule 60(b) relief, the 
Bryans argued that the agreement had been materially 
breached. True, these arguments formed a contract dispute 
distinct from the federal action. But this contract dispute 
stood between the Court and the resolution of the Rule 60 
motion, and, by extension, the enforcement of the jury’s 
verdict on the underlying claim. The Court, therefore, had 
ancillary jurisdiction to decide the dispute. See Dunegan, 251 
F.3d at 478-79.  
The District Court’s contrary conclusion—that it lacked 
the subject matter jurisdiction to consider the enforceability 
of the high-low agreement—rested on Kokkonen v. Guardian 
Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). There, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court does not 
inherently have subject matter jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning “the breach of an agreement that produced the 
dismissal of an earlier federal suit.” Id. at 379. In so doing, 
“Kokkonen rejected any . . . resort to notions of ‘inherent 
power’ as surviving a dismissal order.” Shaffer v. GTE North, 
Inc., 284 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
Kokkonen did, however, chart a procedure by which the 
parties could maintain a federal court’s jurisdiction after 
dismissal. To do so, the parties had to incorporate the terms of 
the settlement into the court’s dismissal order. Thus, “a 
breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, 
and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would 
therefore exist.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381; see In re Phar-
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Mor, Inc. Secs. Litig., 172 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(applying Kokkonen to conclude that district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over motion to enforce settlement 
agreement because it did not incorporate the terms of the 
settlement into its dismissal order or otherwise indicate that it 
retained jurisdiction).  
Kokkonen does not yet have any bearing on this dispute. 
In Kokkonen, the parties had dismissed their suit; in this case, 
the parties had not. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit observed, “this distinction is 
critical.” T Street Dev., LLC v. Dereje & Dereje, 586 F.3d 6, 
10 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The absence of an ongoing matter within 
the district court’s original jurisdiction left the district court in 
Kokkonen without any basis on which to predicate ancillary 
jurisdiction. But here, of course, the Bryans never dismissed 
the case, notwithstanding the high-low agreement. Having 
frustrated dismissal, and thus maintained the action, the 
Bryans cannot contend that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to decide whether to enforce the parties’ 
agreement or the jury’s verdict.  
Finally, the procedural consequences of the District 
Court’s decision underscore its error. By holding that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ settlement agreement, the 
District Court made the outcome of a federal case contingent 
on a state proceeding. Were we to accept the Bryans’ 
argument on appeal, the enforceable worth of the federal 
judgment would be determined in a state proceeding. That 
outcome poses an obstacle to efficiency as well as to 
federalism, and we think it must be undone. 
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B. The District Court must decide the other issues in the 
first instance. 
We do not reach the additional issues the parties call to 
our attention. Those two issues—whether Skalko and Baxter 
breached the settlement agreement and whether Skalko and 
Baxter are entitled to qualified immunity—ought to be 
addressed first by the District Court. 
As to the breach of contract issue, the District Court has 
yet to evaluate the merits of the dispute. This Court 
“ordinarily decline[s] to consider issues not decided by a 
district court, choosing instead to allow that court to consider 
them in the first instance.” Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros 
Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d Cir. 2010). That policy suits 
this circumstance. The parties argue about whether Skalko 
and Baxter breached the agreement by disclosing its terms to 
third parties. Our record of those issues is incomplete and we 
are, therefore, unable to decide them.  
As to qualified immunity, Skalko and Baxter purport to 
raise that issue before us by taking appeal from the District 
Court’s denial of their summary judgment motion. But Skalko 
and Baxter concede that they raised the same immunity 
argument, in light of the trial record, in their Rule 59 motion 
for a new trial. As a general matter, “[o]nce the case proceeds 
to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes the 
record existing at the time of the summary judgment motion.” 
Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 889 (2011). Skalko and 
Baxter have not briefed or argued the merits of the Rule 59 
motion, however, so we need not decide it. Moreover, Skalko 
and Baxter only seek to challenge the District Court’s 
qualified immunity ruling if the high-low agreement cannot 
be enforced. Otherwise, according to the agreement, “any and 
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all appellate rights [have been] waived by all the Plaintiffs; 
and defendants.” (App’x 188.)  
Because Baxter and Skalko have not briefed and argued 
the Rule 59 dispute, and because Skalko and Baxter may have 
waived any appeal of the issue at all, we will not review the 
qualified immunity defense now. Rather, we remand with 
instructions to consider the Rule 59 issues, if appropriate, 
following the Rule 60 decision. 
IV. Conclusion 
When the parties presented the District Court with a 
dispute about whether or not the judgment had been satisfied, 
the District Court had the subject matter jurisdiction to decide 
it. The District Court’s decision to the contrary rested, 
incorrectly, on the theory that no settlement agreement fell 
within a district court’s supplemental jurisdiction unless the 
court incorporated the terms of the agreement into an order. 
In ongoing litigation, district courts have the jurisdiction to 
decide whether the parties have settled the action or have 
satisfied the judgment.  
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s ruling with 
respect to its jurisdiction to consider the high-low agreement 
in the context of the Rule 60 motion. Because the District 
Court’s evaluation of that motion and the other post-trial 
motions rested on its erroneous conclusion that it lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the existence and meaning of the 
high-low agreement, we vacate its order of dismissal. Finally, 
we remand to the District Court to consider the remaining 
post-trial motions in light of this opinion.  
